Maître Innocent TWAGIRAMUNGU,
inyandiko utwoherereje iragira iti: "The civil war in Rwanda and the ethnic massacres were an integral part of US foreign policy, carefully staged in accordance with precise strategic and economic objectives."
Supposons que ibi byanditse muri iyi nteruro ari byo. Byaba bitangaje cyane rero kumva abanyarwanda bamwe (opozisiyo) bahamagarira abanyamerika kubafasha gukuraho Kagame!!! Ubwo se twaba tuva he, twaba tujya he?
Ngabo
P.S.: Ese "Mapping report" yo ntiyaba iri mu murongo wa "US foreign policy"? Kusamira hejuru ibiyanditsemo se, ntibyaba ari "uguhungira ubwayi mu kigunda"???
----- Original Nachricht ----
Von: Democracy&Human Rights <itwagira@yahoo.fr>
An: - - Africadailly <africadaily3@yahoogroups.com>, - Africaforum <Africaforum@yahoogroupes.fr>, DEBOUTCONGOLAIS <debout_congolais1-proprietaire@yahoogroupes.fr>, - DHR <democracy_human_rights@yahoogroupes.fr>, - - Forum Banyarwanda <fondationbanyarwanda@yahoogroupes.fr>, - Great Lakkes <great-lakes@yahoogroups.com>, - NewsKgl-Bxl <NewsKGL-BXL@yahoogroupes.fr>, - Rwanda-l <rwanda-l@yahoogroups.com>, - Rwandanet <rwandanet@yahoogroups.com>, - URWANDA RWACU <uRwanda_rwacu@yahoogroups.com>, - Congo <congo@yahoogroupes.fr>, Congo <congokin-tribune@yahoogroupes.fr>
Datum: 03.06.2013 12:22
Betreff: *DHR* The US was behind the Rwandan Genocide: Installing a US Protectorate in Central Africa
> http://globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO305A.html
>
> The US was behind the Rwandan
> Genocide:
> Rwanda: Installing a US
> Protectorate in Central Africa
> by Michel Chossudovsky
> www.globalresearch.ca 8 May
> 2003
> The URL of this article is: http://globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO305A.html
>
> Originally written in May 2000, the following
> text is Part II of Chapter 7 entitled "Economic Genocide in Rwanda", of the
>
> Second Edition of The Globalization of
> Poverty and the New World Order , Global Outlook, Shanty Bay, Ont.
> 2003.This text updates the author's analysis on
> Rwanda written in 1995 , which was published in the first edition of
> Globalization of Poverty, TWN and Zed Books, Penang and London, 1997. To
> order the Second Edition of The Globalization
> of Poverty, click here .
> This text is in part based on the results of
> a study conducted by the author together with Belgian economist Pierre
> Galand on
> the use of Rwanda's 1990-94 external debt to finance the military and
> paramilitary.
>
> >________________________________
> > The civil war in Rwanda and the ethnic
> massacres were an integral part of US foreign policy, carefully staged in
> accordance with precise strategic and economic objectives.
> >________________________________
> >
> >From the outset of the Rwandan civil war in
> 1990, Washington's hidden agenda consisted in establishing an American
> sphere of
> influence in a region historically dominated by France and Belgium.
> America's design was to displace France by supporting the Rwandan Patriotic
>
> Front and by arming and equipping its military arm, the Rwandan Patriotic
> Army
> (RPA)
> >From the mid-1980s, the Kampala government
> under President Yoweri Musaveni had become Washington's African showpiece of
>
> "democracy". Uganda had also become a launchpad for US sponsored guerilla
> movements into the Sudan, Rwanda and the Congo. Major General Paul Kagame
> had
> been head of military intelligence in the Ugandan Armed Forces; he had been
>
> trained at the U.S. Army Command and Staff College (CGSC) in Leavenworth,
> Kansas
> which focuses on warfighting and military strategy. Kagame returned from
> Leavenworth to lead the RPA, shortly after the 1990 invasion.
> >Prior to the outbreak of the Rwandan civil
> war, the RPA was part of the Ugandan Armed Forces. Shortly prior to the
> October
> 1990 invasion of Rwanda, military labels were switched. From one day to the
>
> next, large numbers of Ugandan soldiers joined the ranks of the Rwandan
> Patriotic Army (RPA). Throughout the civil war, the RPA was supplied from
> United
> People's Defense Forces (UPDF) military bases inside Uganda. The Tutsi
> commissioned officers in the Ugandan army took over positions in the RPA.
> The
> October 1990 invasion by Ugandan forces was presented to public opinion as a
> war
> of liberation by a Tutsi led guerilla army.Militarization of Uganda
> >The militarization of Uganda was an integral
> part of US foreign policy. The build-up of the Ugandan UPDF Forces and of
> the
> Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) had been supported by the US and Britain. The
> British had provided military training at the Jinja military base:
> >"From 1989 onwards, America supported joint
> RPF [Rwandan Patriotic Front]-Ugandan attacks upon Rwanda... There were at
> least
> 56 'situation reports' in [US] State Department files in 1991? As American
> and
> British relations with Uganda and the RPF strengthened, so hostilities
> between
> Uganda and Rwanda escalated? By August 1990 the RPF had begun preparing an
> invasion with the full knowledge and approval of British intelligence.
> 20
> >Troops from Rwanda's RPA and Uganda's UPDF had
> also supported John Garang's People's Liberation Army in its secessionist
> war in
> southern Sudan. Washington was firmly behind these initiatives with covert
> support provided by the CIA. 21
> >Moreover, under the Africa Crisis
> Reaction Initiative (ACRI), Ugandan
> officers were also being trained by US Special Forces in collaboration with
> a
> mercenary outfit, Military
> Professional Resources Inc (MPRI) which was on contract with the US
> Department of State. MPRI had provided similar training to the Kosovo
> Liberation
> Army (KLA) and the Croatian Armed Forces during the Yugoslav civil war and
> more
> recently to the Colombian Military in the context of Plan
> Colombia.Militarization and the Ugandan External
> Debt
> >The buildup of the Ugandan external debt under
> President Musaveni coincided chronologically with the Rwandan and Congolese
>
> civil wars. With the accession of Musaveni to the presidency in 1986, the
> Ugandan external debt stood at 1.3 billion dollars. With the gush of fresh
> money, the external debt spiraled overnight, increasing almost threefold to
> 3.7
> billion by 1997. In fact, Uganda had no outstanding debt to the World Bank
> at
> the outset of its "economic recovery program". By 1997, it owed almost 2
> billion
> dollars solely to the World Bank. 22
> >Where did the money go? The foreign
> loans to the Musaveni government had been tagged to support the country's
> economic and social reconstruction. In the wake of a protracted civil war,
> the
> IMF sponsored "economic stabilization program" required massive budget cuts
> of
> all civilian programs.
> >The World Bank was responsible for monitoring
> the Ugandan budget on behalf of the creditors. Under the "public expenditure
>
> review" (PER), the government was obliged to fully reveal the precise
> allocation
> of its budget. In other words, every single category of expenditure
> --including the budget of the Ministry of Defense-- was open to scrutiny by
> the
> World Bank. Despite the austerity measures (imposed solely on "civilian"
> expenditures), the donors had allowed defense spending to increase without
> impediment.
> >Part of the money tagged for civilian programs
> had been diverted into funding the United People's Defense Force (UPDF)
> which in
> turn was involved in military operations in Rwanda and the Congo. The
> Ugandan
> external debt was being used to finance these military operations on behalf
> of
> Washington with the country and its people ultimately footing the bill. In
> fact
> by curbing social expenditures, the austerity measures had facilitated the
> reallocation of State of revenue in favor of the Ugandan military.
> >Financing both Sides in the Civil
> War
> >A similar process of financing military
> expenditure from the external debt had occurred in Rwanda under the
> Habyarimana government. In a cruel irony, both sides in the civil war were
> financed by the same donors institutions with the World Bank acting as a
> Watchdog.
> >The Habyarimana regime had at its disposal an
> arsenal of military equipment, including 83mm missile launchers, French made
>
> Blindicide, Belgian and German made light weaponry, and automatic weapons
> such
> as kalachnikovs made in Egypt, China and South Africa [as well as ...
> armored
> AML-60 and M3 armored vehicles.23 While part of these purchases had been
> financed by direct military aid from France, the influx of development loans
>
> from the World Bank's soft lending affiliate the International Development
> Association (IDA), the African Development Fund (AFD), the European
> Development
> Fund (EDF) as well as from Germany, the United States, Belgium and Canada
> had
> been diverted into funding the military and Interhamwe militia.
> >A detailed investigation of government files,
> accounts and correspondence conducted in Rwanda in 1996-97 by the author
> --together with Belgian economist Pierre Galand-- confirmed that many of the
>
> arms purchases had been negotiated outside the framework of government to
> government military aid agreements through various intermediaries and
> private
> arms dealers. These transactions --recorded as bona fide government
> expenditures-- had nonetheless been included in the State budget which was
> under
> the supervision of the World Bank. Large quantities of machetes and other
> items
> used in the 1994 ethnic massacres --routinely classified as "civilian
> commodities" -- had been imported through regular trading channels.
> 24
> >According to the files of the National Bank of
> Rwanda (NBR), some of these imports had been financed in violation of
> agreements
> signed with the donors. According to NBR records of import invoices,
> approximately one million machetes had been imported through various
> channels
> including Radio Mille Collines, an organization linked to the Interhamwe
> militia
> and used to foment ethnic hatred. 25
> >The money had been earmarked by the donors to
> support Rwanda's economic and social development. It was clearly stipulated
> that
> funds could not be used to import: "military expenditures on arms,
> ammunition
> and other military material". 26 In fact, the loan agreement with the World
>
> Bank's IDA was even more stringent. The money could not be used to import
> civilian commodities such as fuel, foodstuffs, medicine, clothing and
> footwear
> "destined for military or paramilitary use". The records of the NBR
> nonetheless confirm that the Habyarimana government used World Bank money to
>
> finance the import of machetes which had been routinely classified as
> imports of
> "civilian commodities." 27
> >An army of consultants and auditors had been
> sent in by World Bank to assess the Habyarimana government's "policy
> performance" under the loan agreement.28 The use of donor funds to import
> machetes and other material used in the massacres of civilians did not show
> up
> in the independent audit commissioned by the government and the World Bank.
>
> (under the IDA loan agreement. (IDA Credit Agreement. 2271-RW).29 In 1993,
> the
> World Bank decided to suspend the disbursement of the second installment of
> its
> IDA loan. There had been, according to the World Bank mission unfortunate
> "slip-ups" and "delays" in policy implementation. The free market reforms
> were
> no longer "on track", the conditionalities --including the privatization of
>
> state assets-- had not been met. The fact that the country was involved in a
>
> civil war was not even mentioned. How the money was spent was never an
> issue.30
> >Whereas the World Bank had frozen the second
> installment (tranche) of the IDA loan, the money granted in 1991 had been
> deposited in a Special Account at the Banque Bruxelles Lambert in Brussels.
> This
> account remained open and accessible to the former regime (in exile), two
> months
> after the April 1994 ethnic massacres.31
> >Postwar Cover-up
> >In the wake of the civil war, the World Bank
> sent a mission to Kigali with a view to drafting a so-called loan
> "Completion
> Report".32 This was a routine exercise, largely focussing on macro-economic
>
> rather than political issues. The report acknowledged that"the war
> effort prompted the [former] government to increase substantially spending,
> well
> beyond the fiscal targets agreed under the SAP.33 The misappropriation of
> World
> Bank money was not mentioned. Instead the Habyarimana government was praised
> for
> having "made genuine major efforts-- especially in 1991-- to reduce domestic
>
> and external financial imbalances, eliminate distortions hampering export
> growth
> and diversification and introduce market based mechanisms for resource
> allocation..." 34, The massacres of civilians were not mentioned; from the
> point of view of the donors, "nothing had happened". In fact the World Bank
>
> completion report failed to even acknowledge the existence of a civil war
> prior
> to April 1994.In the wake of the Civil War: Reinstating the
> IMF's Deadly Economic Reforms
> >In 1995, barely a year after the 1994
> ethnic massacres. Rwanda's external creditors entered into discussions with
> the
> Tutsi led RPF government regarding the debts of the former regime which had
> been
> used to finance the massacres. The RPF decided to fully recognize the
> legitimacy
> of the "odious debts" of the 1990-94. RPF strongman Vice-President Paul
> Kagame
> [now President] instructed the Cabinet not to pursue the matter nor to
> approach
> the World Bank. Under pressure from Washington, the RPF was not to enter
> into
> any form of negotiations, let alone an informal dialogue with the
> donors.
> >The legitimacy of the wartime debts was never
> questioned. Instead, the creditors had carefully set up procedures to ensure
>
> their prompt reimbursement. In 1998 at a special donors' meeting in
> Stockholm, a
> Multilateral Trust Fund of 55.2 million dollars was set up under the banner
> of
> postwar reconstruction.35 In fact, none of this money was destined for
> Rwanda.
> It had been earmarked to service Rwanda's "odious debts" with the World Bank
>
> (--i.e. IDA debt), the African Development Bank and the International Fund
> for
> Agricultural Development (IFAD).
> >In other words, "fresh money" --which Rwanda
> will eventually have to reimburse-- was lent to enable Rwanda to service the
>
> debts used to finance the massacres. Old loans had been swapped for new
> debts
> under the banner of post-war reconstruction.36 The "odious debts" had been
> whitewashed, they had disappeared from the books. The creditor's
> responsibility
> had been erased. Moreover, the scam was also conditional upon the acceptance
> of
> a new wave of IMF-World Bank reforms.Post War "Reconstruction and
> Reconciliation"
> >Bitter economic medicine was imposed under the
> banner of "reconstruction and reconciliation". In fact the IMF post-conflict
>
> reform package was far stringent than that imposed at the outset of the
> civil
> war in 1990. While wages and employment had fallen to abysmally low levels,
> the
> IMF had demanded a freeze on civil service wages alongside a massive
> retrenchment of teachers and health workers. The objective was to "restore
> macro-economic stability". A downsizing of the civil service was launched.37
>
> Civil service wages were not to exceed 4.5 percent of GDP, so-called
> "unqualified civil servants" (mainly teachers) were to be removed from the
> State
> payroll. 38
> >Meanwhile, the country's per capita income had collapsed
> from $360 (prior to the war) to $140 in 1995. State revenues had been tagged
> to
> service the external debt. Kigali's Paris Club debts were rescheduled in
> exchange for "free market" reforms. Remaining State assets were sold off to
>
> foreign capital at bargain prices.
> >The Tutsi led RPF government rather than
> demanding the cancellation of Rwanda's odious debts, had welcomed the
> Bretton
> Woods institutions with open arms. They needed the IMF "greenlight" to boost
> the
> development of the military.
> >Despite the austerity measures, defense
> expenditure continued to grow. The 1990-94 pattern had been reinstated. The
>
> development loans granted since 1995 were not used to finance the country's
>
> economic and social development. Outside money had again been diverted into
>
> financing a military buildup, this time of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA).
> And
> this build-up of the RPA occurred in the period immediately preceding the
> outbreak of civil war in former Zaire.Civil War in the Congo
> >Following the installation of a US client
> regime in Rwanda in 1994, US trained Rwandan and Ugandan forces intervened
> in
> former Zaire --a stronghold of French and Belgian influence under President
>
> Mobutu Sese Seko. Amply documented, US special operations troops -- mainly
> Green
> Berets from the 3rd Special Forces Group based at Fort Bragg, N.C.-- had
> been
> actively training the RPA. This program was a continuation of the covert
> support
> and military aid provided to the RPA prior to 1994. In turn, the tragic
> outcome
> of the Rwandan civil war including the refugee crisis had set the stage for
> the
> participation of Ugandan and Rwandan RPA in the civil war in the
> Congo:
> >"Washington pumped military aid into Kagame's
> army, and U.S. Army Special Forces and other military personnel trained
> hundreds
> of Rwandan troops. But Kagame and his colleagues had designs of their own.
> While
> the Green Berets trained the Rwandan Patriotic Army, that army was itself
> secretly training Zairian rebels.? [In] Rwanda, U.S. officials publicly
> portrayed their engagement with the army as almost entirely devoted to human
>
> rights training. But the Special Forces exercises also covered other areas,
>
> including combat skills? Hundreds of soldiers and officers were enrolled in
> U.S.
> training programs, both in Rwanda and in the United States? [C]onducted by
> U.S.
> Special Forces, Rwandans studied camouflage techniques, small-unit movement,
>
> troop-leading procedures, soldier-team development, [etc]? And while the
> training went on, U.S. officials were meeting regularly with Kagame and
> other
> senior Rwandan leaders to discuss the continuing military threat faced by
> the
> [former Rwandan] government [in exile] from inside Zaire? Clearly, the focus
> of
> Rwandan-U.S. military discussion had shifted from how to build human rights
> to
> how to combat an insurgency? With [Ugandan President] Museveni's support,
> Kagame
> conceived a plan to back a rebel movement in eastern Zaire [headed by
> Laurent
> Desire Kabila] ... The operation was launched in October 1996, just a few
> weeks
> after Kagame's trip to Washington and the completion of the Special Forces
> training mission? Once the war [in the Congo] started, the United States
> provided "political assistance" to Rwanda,? An official of the U.S. Embassy
> in
> Kigali traveled to eastern Zaire numerous times to liaise with Kabila. Soon,
> the
> rebels had moved on. Brushing off the Zairian army with the help of the
> Rwandan
> forces, they marched through Africa's third-largest nation in seven months,
> with
> only a few significant military engagements. Mobutu fled the capital,
> Kinshasa,
> in May 1997, and Kabila took power, changing the name of the country to
> Congo?U.S. officials deny that there were any U.S. military personnel with
> Rwandan troops in Zaire during the war, although unconfirmed reports of a
> U.S.
> advisory presence have circulated in the region since the war's earliest
> days.39American Mining Interests
> >At stake in these military operations in the
> Congo were the extensive mining resources of Eastern and Southern Zaire
> including strategic reserves of cobalt -- of crucial importance for the US
> defense industry. During the civil war several months before the downfall of
>
> Mobutu, Laurent Desire Kabila basedin Goma, Eastern Zaire had renegotiated
> the
> mining contracts with several US and British mining companies including
> American
> Mineral Fields (AMF), a company headquartered in President Bill Clinton's
> hometown of Hope, Arkansas.40
> >Meanwhile back in Washington, IMF officials
> were busy reviewing Zaire's macro-economic situation. No time was lost. The
>
> post-Mobutu economic agenda had already been decided upon. In a study
> released
> in April 1997 barely a month before President Mobutu Sese Seko fled the
> country,
> the IMF had recommended "halting currency issue completely and abruptly" as
> part of an economic recovery programme.41 And a few months later upon
> assuming power in Kinshasa, the new government of Laurent Kabila Desire was
>
> ordered by the IMF to freeze civil service wages with a view to "restoring
> macro-economic stability." Eroded by hyperinflation, the average public
> sector
> wage had fallen to 30,000 new Zaires (NZ) a month, the equivalent of one
> U.S.
> dollar.42
> >The IMF's demands were tantamount to
> maintaining the entire population in abysmal poverty. They precluded from
> the
> outset a meaningful post-war economic reconstruction, thereby contributing
> to
> fuelling the continuation of the Congolese civil war in which close to 2
> million
> people have died.
> >Concluding Remarks
> >The civil war in Rwanda was a brutal struggle
> for political power between the Hutu-led Habyarimana government supported by
>
> France and the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) backed financially and
> militarily by Washington. Ethnic rivalries were used deliberately in the
> pursuit
> of geopolitical objectives. Both the CIA and French intelligence were
> involved.
> >In the words of former Cooperation Minister
> Bernard Debré in the government of Prime Minister Henri Balladur:
> >"What one forgets to say is that, if France
> was on one side, the Americans were on the other, arming the Tutsis who
> armed
> the Ugandans. I don't want to portray a showdown between the French and the
>
> Anglo-Saxons, but the truth must be told."
> 43
> >In addition to military aid to the warring
> factions, the influx of development loans played an important role in
> "financing
> the conflict." In other words, both the Ugandan and Rwanda external debts
> were
> diverted into supporting the military and paramilitary. Uganda's external
> debt
> increased by more than 2 billion dollars, --i.e. at a significantly faster
> pace
> than that of Rwanda (an increase of approximately 250 million dollars from
> 1990
> to 1994). In retrospect, the RPA -- financed by US military aid and Uganda's
>
> external debt-- was much better equipped and trained than the Forces Armées
> du
> Rwanda (FAR) loyal to President Habyarimana. From the outset, the RPA had a
>
> definite military advantage over the FAR.
> >According to the testimony of Paul Mugabe, a
> former member of the RPF High Command Unit, Major General Paul Kagame had
> personally ordered the shooting down of President Habyarimana's plane with a
>
> view to taking control of the country. He was fully aware that the
> assassination
> of Habyarimana would unleash "a genocide" against Tutsi civilians. RPA
> forces
> had been fully deployed in Kigali at the time the ethnic massacres took
> place
> and did not act to prevent it from happening:
> >The decision of Paul Kagame to shoot Pres.
> Habyarimana's aircraft was the catalyst of an unprecedented drama in Rwandan
>
> history, and Major-General Paul Kagame took that decision with all
> awareness.
> Kagame's ambition caused the extermination of all of our families: Tutsis,
> Hutus
> and Twas. We all lost. Kagame's take-over took away the lives of a large
> number
> of Tutsis and caused the unnecessary exodus of millions of Hutus, many of
> whom
> were innocent under the hands of the genocide ringleaders. Some naive
> Rwandans
> proclaimed Kagame as their savior, but time has demonstrated that it was he
> who
> caused our suffering and misfortunes? Can Kagame explain to the Rwandan
> people
> why he sent Claude Dusaidi and Charles Muligande to New York and Washington
> to
> stop the UN military intervention which was supposed to be sent and protect
> the
> Rwandan people from the genocide? The reason behind avoiding that military
> intervention was to allow the RPF leadership the takeover of the Kigali
> Government and to show the world that they - the RPF - were the ones who
> stopped
> the genocide. We will all remember that the genocide occurred during three
> months, even though Kagame has said that he was capable of stopping it the
> first
> week after the aircraft crash. Can Major-General Paul Kagame explain why he
>
> asked to MINUAR to leave Rwandan soil within hours while the UN was
> examining
> the possibility of increasing its troops in Rwanda in order to stop the
> genocide?44
> >Paul Mugabe's testimony regarding the shooting
> down of Habyarimana's plane ordered by Kagame is corroborated by
> intelligence
> documents and information presented to the French parliamentary inquiry.
> Major
> General Paul Kagame was an instrument of Washington. The loss of African
> lives
> did not matter. The civil war in Rwanda and the ethnic massacres were an
> integral part of US foreign policy, carefully staged in accordance with
> precise
> strategic and economic objectives.
> >Despite the good diplomatic relations between
> Paris and Washington and the apparent unity of the Western military
> alliance, it was an undeclared war between France and America. By supporting
> the
> build up of Ugandan and Rwandan forces and by directly intervening in the
> Congolese civil war, Washington also bears a direct responsibility for the
> ethnic massacres committed in the Eastern Congo including several hundred
> thousand people who died in refugee camps.
> >US policy-makers were fully aware that a
> catastrophe was imminent. In fact four months before the genocide, the
> CIAhad warned the US State Department in a confidential
> brief that the Arusha Accords would fail and "that if hostilities resumed,
> then upward of half a million people would die". 45 This information was
> withheld from the United Nations: "it was not until the genocide was over
> that
> information was passed to Maj.-Gen. Dallaire [who was in charge of UN forces
> in
> Rwanda]." 46
> >Washington's objective was to displace France,
> discredit the French government (which had supported the Habyarimana regime)
> and
> install an Anglo-American protectorate in Rwanda under Major General Paul
> Kagame. Washington deliberately did nothing to prevent the ethnic
> massacres.
> >When a UN force was put forth, Major General
> Paul Kagame sought to delay its implementation stating that he would only
> accept
> a peacekeeping force once the RPA was in control of Kigali. Kagame "feared
> [that] the proposed United Nations force of more than 5,000 troops? [might]
>
> intervene to deprive them [the RPA] of victory".47 Meanwhile the Security
> Council after deliberation and a report from Secretary General Boutros
> Boutros
> Ghali decided to postpone its intervention.
> >The 1994 Rwandan "genocide" served strictly
> strategic and geopolitical objectives. The ethnic massacres were a stumbling
>
> blow to France's credibility which enabled the US to establish a neocolonial
>
> foothold in Central Africa. From a distinctly Franco-Belgian colonial
> setting,
> the Rwandan capital Kigali has become --under the expatriate Tutsi led RPF
> government-- distinctly Anglo-American. English has become the dominant
> language
> in government and the private sector. Many private businesses owned by Hutus
>
> were taken over in 1994 by returning Tutsi expatriates. The latter had been
>
> exiled in Anglophone Africa, the US and Britain.
> >The Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) functions in
> English and Kinyarwanda, the University previously linked to France and
> Belgium
> functions in English. While English had become an official language
> alongside
> French and Kinyarwanda, French political and cultural influence will
> eventually
> be erased. Washington has become the new colonial master of a francophone
> country.
> >Several other francophone countries in
> Sub-Saharan Africa have entered into military cooperation agreements with
> the
> US. These countries are slated by Washington to follow suit on the pattern
> set
> in Rwanda. Meanwhile in francophone West Africa, the US dollar is rapidly
> displacing the CFA Franc -- which is linked in a currency board arrangement
> to
> the French Treasury.
> ________________________________
> Notes
> (Endnote
> numbering as in the original chapter) 1. Written in 1999, the following text
> is Part II of Chapter 5
> on the Second Edition of The Globalization of Poverty and the New World
> Order. The first part of chapter published in the first edition was written
>
> in 1994. Part II is in part based on a study conducted by the author and
> Belgian
> economist Pierre Galand on the use of Rwanda's 1990-94 external debt to
> finance
> the military and paramilitary.
> > 2. Africa Direct, Submission to the UN Tribunal on Rwanda,
> > 1. http://www.junius.co.uk/africa- direct/tribunal.html Ibid. * Africa's
> New Look, Jane's Foreign Report, August 14,
> 1997.
> > * Jim Mugunga, Uganda foreign debt hits Shs 4 trillion, The
> Monitor, Kampala, 19 February 1997.
> > * Michel Chossudovsky and Pierre Galand, L'usage de la
> dette exterieure du Rwanda, la responsabilité des créanciers, mission
> report, United Nations Development Program and Government of Rwanda, Ottawa
> and
> Brussels, 1997.
> > * Ibid
> > * Ibid
> > * ibid, the imports recorded were of the order of kg. 500.000
> of machetes or approximately one million machetes.
> > * Ibid
> > * Ibid. See also schedule 1.2 of the Development Credit
> Agreement with IDA, Washington, 27 June 1991, CREDIT IDA 2271 RW.
> > * Chossudovsky and Galand, op cit
> > * Ibid.
> > * Ibid. * World Bank completion report,
> > * quoted in Chossudovsky and Galand, op cit.
> > * Ibid
> > * Ibid
> > * See World Bank, Rwanda at
> > 2. http://www.worldbank.org/afr/rw2.htm. * Ibid, italics added
> > * A ceiling on the number of public employees had been set at
> 38,000 for 1998 down from 40,600 in 1997. See Letter of Intent of the
> Government
> of Rwanda including cover letter addressed to IMF Managing Director Michel
> Camdessus, IMF, Washington, http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/060498.htm ,
> 1998.
> > * Ibid.
> > * Lynne Duke Africans Use US Military Training in Unexpected
> Ways, Washington Post. July 14, 1998; p.A01.
> > * Musengwa Kayaya, U.S. Company To Invest in Zaire,
> Pan African News, 9 May 1997.
> > * International Monetary Fund, Zaire Hyperinflation
> 1990-1996, Washington, April 1997.
> > * Alain Shungu Ngongo, Zaire-Economy: How to Survive On a
> Dollar a Month, International Press Service, 6 June 1996.
> > * Quoted in Therese LeClerc. "Who is responsible for the
> genocide in Rwanda?", World Socialist website at
> http://www.wsws.org/index.shtml , 29
> April 1998.
> > * Paul Mugabe, The Shooting Down Of The Aircraft Carrying
> Rwandan President Habyarimama , testimony to the International Strategic
> Studies
> Association (ISSA), Alexandria, Virginia, 24 April 2000.
> > * Linda Melvern, Betrayal of the Century, Ottawa
> Citizen, Ottawa, 8 April 2000.
> > * Ibid
> > * Scott Peterson, Peacekeepers will not halt carnage, say
> Rwanda, rebels, Daily Telegraph, London, May 12, 1994.
>
> UT UNUM SINT
>
> Maître Innocent TWAGIRAMUNGU, DHR FOUNDER&OWNER
> http://fr.groups.yahoo.com/group/democracy_human_rights
>
>
> " BE NICE TO PEOPLE ON YOUR WAY UP, BECAUSE YOU MIGHT MEET THEM ON YOUR WAY
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>
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" BE NICE TO PEOPLE ON YOUR WAY UP, BECAUSE YOU MIGHT MEET THEM ON YOUR WAY DOWN." Jimmy DURANTE.
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Let's rather prefer Peace, Love , Hope and Life, and get together as one!!! Inno TWAGIRA
