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Wednesday, 29 January 2014

[RwandaLibre] Rwanda: Repression Across Borders | Human Rights Watch

 

Attacks and Threats Against Rwandan Opponents and Critics Abroad
JANUARY 28, 2014

Since the genocide which devastated the country and claimed more than half a million lives in 1994, Rwanda has made great strides in rebuilding its infrastructure, developing its economy, and delivering public services. But civil and political rights remain severely curtailed, and freedom of expression is tightly restricted. The government dominated by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)—a former rebel movement that ended the genocide—does not tolerate opposition, challenge, or criticism. In the 19 years since the RPF took power, Human Rights Watch has documented numerous cases of arbitrary arrests, detentions, prosecutions, killings, torture, enforced disappearances, threats, harassment, and intimidation against government opponents and critics. These abuses emerged in the immediate post-genocide period in the mid-1990s and have continued to this day.
In addition to the repression of critical voices inside Rwanda, dissidents and real or perceived critics outside the country—in neighboring Uganda and Kenya, as well as farther afield in South Africa and Europe—have been victims of attacks and threats. 
This document highlights some of the cases involving attacks or threats against critics outside Rwanda since the late 1990s. This list is not exhaustive. Human Rights Watch has documented these cases or received reliable information indicating that the victims are likely to have been targeted because of their criticisms of the Rwandan government, the RPF or President Paul Kagame. There have been other cases of Rwandans who were murdered, attacked, threatened, or who died in unclear circumstances in various countries, but are not included because of insufficient information surrounding these attacks.[1]

Background on Attacks

The victims of the attacks abroad have tended to be political opponents or outspoken critics of the Rwandan government or President Kagame himself. Former RPF officials who have turned against President Kagame and become opponents in exile have particularly been targets of attacks and threats. There are similarities between attacks in high-profile cases, for example, the assassinations of former Minister of Interior Seth Sendashonga in 1998 and former Head of External Intelligence Patrick Karegeya in 2014, and the attempted assassination of former army Chief of Staff Kayumba Nyamwasa in 2010, the former in Kenya, and the latter two in South Africa.
A number of the victims had been granted refugee status in the country to which they had fled, in recognition of the risks they faced in Rwanda. The fact that even recognized refugees have fallen prey to such attacks has heightened fears among exiled Rwandans, who now believe that no one is out of reach.
The persistence of attacks on Rwandan government critics in exile, going back almost 20 years, is striking, with the latest such murder—that of Patrick Karegeya—taking place in January 2014. As critics or opponents of the government, the victims all share a certain profile; prior to these attacks many had been threatened by individuals who were part of, or close to, the Rwandan government. The fact that within Rwanda itself, many government opponents have also faced threats and attacks, and the context of the broader persecution of government critics, provide credibility to the allegation that these attacks were politically motivated. They also raise serious and plausible concerns about the possibility of official state collusion in, or tolerance of, these attacks.
When there is an allegation or suggestion that there may have been collusion of state agents in a killing or an attack, international human rights law requires a prompt, public, independent, and effective investigation to examine the possibility of collusion, seriously and effectively.
However, an issue of concern in almost all the cases cited in this document is the failure to make progress in effective investigations capable of identifying the perpetrators, particularly those who ordered the attacks, and bringing them to justice. With the exception of the trial of six people accused of involvement in the attempted assassination of Kayumba Nyamwasa in South Africa in 2010, which was ongoing at the time of writing, there have been few arrests and even fewer prosecutions. Three men charged and tried in connection with the assassination of one of the most prominent victims, Seth Sendashonga, in Kenya in 1998, were acquitted. No one has been convicted of his murder.

The Rwandan Government Response

The Rwandan government has consistently denied any involvement in attacks and threats against its political opponents and critics, and reacted with indignation to allegations that these attacks may have been ordered or facilitated from Kigali. 
On occasion, Rwandan government officials have attempted to discredit or insult the victims soon after their death, especially when they have been outspoken government opponents. 
For example, reacting to allegations that the Rwandan government may have been behind the murder of journalist Charles Ingabire in Uganda in November 2011, President Kagame told journalists: "That is merely one of the assumptions and I don't think we need to work on just one assumption and neglect the facts. It is wrong, absolutely wrong." Claiming that the Rwandan authorities had evidence that Ingabire had embezzled money before fleeing to Uganda, he said: "We have many cases like this in Rwanda of people committing crimes and claiming political persecution."[2]
More recently, following the murder of Patrick Karegeya in South Africa in January 2014, the Rwandan president, prime minister and ministers of foreign affairs and defence all publicly used strong language, branding Karegeya as a traitor and an enemy and implying that he got what he deserved. 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Louise Mushikiwabo wrote on Twitter on January 5, 2014: "It's not about how u start, it's how u finish. This man was a self-declared enemy of my Gov & my country, U expect pity?" The following day, Prime Minister Pierre Damien Habumuremyi tweeted: "Betraying citizens and their country that made you a man shall always bear consequences to you." 
An article in News of Rwanda quoted Minister of Defence James Kabarebe saying, during a speech in Gisenyi on January 11, 2014: "Do not waste your time on reports that so and so was strangled with a rope on flat 7 in whatever country[3]…When you choose to be a dog, you die like a dog, and the cleaners will wipe away the trash so that it does not stink for them. Actually, such consequences are faced by those who have chosen such a path. There is nothing we can do about it, and we should not be interrogated over it."[4]
Most significantly, President Kagame came close to condoning Karegeya's murder in a public speech on January 12, 2014, when he stated: "Whoever betrays the country will pay the price. I assure you. Letting down a country, wishing harm on people, you end up suffering the negative consequences. Any person still alive who may be plotting against Rwanda, whoever they are, will pay the price…Whoever it is, it is a matter of time." He added: "I hear some of our people saying: we are not the ones who did it. It's true they were not the ones who did it, but that is not my concern, because you should be doing it… What is surprising is that you are not doing it. People who dare to betray, betray the country!" Kagame referenced a series of grenade attacks in Kigali, which the government had previously blamed on Karegeya and his collaborators, and said: "And we have to be apologetic about that? Never!"[5]
On the same day, the following tweet was posted from the official twitter account of the President's office: "I do not have to be apologetic about people who forgot that Rwanda made them who they are and kill innocent people and children"; and "Those who criticize Rwanda know how far they go to protect their own nation." 

The Role of Foreign Governments

In most cases, there is no suggestion that the host governments of the countries where the victims were living colluded in these attacks in any way. On the contrary, these incidents have at times strained diplomatic relations between Rwanda and some of its most important allies, such as Kenya, South Africa, and the United Kingdom.

Uganda

The situation in Uganda is less clear, mainly because there has been a lack of transparency in the Ugandan authorities' efforts to investigate and bring to justice perpetrators of attacks on Rwandans in Uganda. Human Rights Watch is not aware of evidence that Ugandan government authorities have been officially or directly involved in particular incidents, though in at least one case, a high-ranking Ugandan police officer facilitated the forcible return of a Rwandan refugee from Uganda to Rwanda. However, longstanding personal relationships between some Ugandan and Rwandan officials may obstruct access to information about possible collusion to facilitate the commission of these crimes.
Many Rwandans initially flee to Uganda because of its proximity. However, it has become one of the least safe countries for Rwandans facing political persecution because of the close links between the police and intelligence services of the two countries. Diplomatic relations between Uganda and Rwanda have fluctuated over the years, but many senior Rwandan officials, particularly those who grew up in Uganda and served in the Ugandan security forces or intelligence services, retain close links in the country. Rwandan agents can therefore operate in Uganda with considerable ease. 
In the past four years alone, numerous Rwandan refugees and asylum-seekers in Uganda have reported to Human Rights Watch a range of incidents, including personal threats by people they know or believe to be Rwandan, attacks on their homes, beatings, attempted abductions, and, in the most serious cases, killings or attempted killings. Some have also reported being threatened and intimidated by Rwandan diplomatic representatives in Uganda.
Refugees or asylum-seekers who are known to be political opponents, critics, or outspoken journalists, are particularly at risk. For example, following the 2010 presidential elections in Rwanda, several members of Rwandan opposition parties and journalists who had fled Rwanda for their safety were personally threatened in Uganda. Most of them have since moved to other countries.  
Ugandan journalists who have investigated or reported on security threats against Rwandans in Uganda have also raised concerns for their own security, particularly in 2013.

Need for Action

Human Rights Watch calls on governments of host countries to heighten protection of Rwandan refugees and asylum-seekers who may have well-founded fears for their security in exile, and to carry out thorough investigations into attacks and threats against Rwandan government opponents and critics on their territory, in order to bring those responsible to justice. The Rwandan government should cooperate fully with such investigations.
Donors and foreign governments with links to Rwanda should press for thorough investigations into these incidents and for full cooperation by the Rwandan government with the authorities of the countries concerned.  

Attacks and Threats Against Rwandan Opponents and Critics Abroad:

1996—2014

October 6, 1996
Assassination of Théoneste Lizinde and Augustin Bugirimfura
Théoneste Lizinde—an RPF colonel, former member of parliament and former member of the intelligence services under the government of President Juvénal Habyarimana—and businessman Augustin Bugirimfura both disappeared from Lizinde's home in the Kenyan capital Nairobi on October 6, 1996. Two days later, their bodies were found on the outskirts of Nairobi; they had been shot dead.
Kenya
May 16, 1998
Assassination of Seth Sendashonga
Seth Sendashonga was minister of interior in the government formed by the RPF after the genocide. After challenging some of the RPF's policies and protesting against human rights abuses, he resigned from the cabinet in August 1995 and fled to Kenya. From exile, he criticized the government more publicly and founded an opposition group. After surviving a first assassination attempt on February 26, 1996, in which he and his nephew were injured, he was shot dead in Nairobi in May 1998, along with his driver.[6]
Three men (one Rwandan and two Ugandans) were arrested and charged with conspiracy and murder. They were tried by a Kenyan court, found not guilty and released. In a statement on May 31, 2001, a Kenyan High Court judge said that he was persuaded that the murder of Sendashonga was political and that there was no evidence connecting the three accused to the "political clues".[7]
A man who worked for the Rwandan embassy in Nairobi was arrested in connection with the 1996 assassination attempt, but Kenyan investigations were frustrated by the lack of cooperation of the Rwandan government, which refused to waive his diplomatic immunity. The suspect was released without trial.
Photo © ISCID 
Kenya
April 7, 2003  
Disappearance of Léonard Hitimana
Léonard Hitimana, a member of parliament for theMouvement démocratique républicain (MDR) opposition party, disappeared on April 7, 2003, after leaving the house of another MDR parliamentarian in the Rwandan capital Kigali. The Rwandan police said his car was found near the Ugandan border. Hitimana's fate remains unknown.[8]
Rwanda/
Uganda
April 23, 2003
Disappearance of Augustin Cyiza
Lieutenant-Colonel Augustin Cyiza, a demobilized army officer, human rights activist, former president of the Cour de Cassation and vice-president of the Supreme Court, disappeared in April 2003. He was last seen in Kigali, but his vehicle was reportedly found near the
Ugandan border. Cyiza's fate is unknown.[9]
Rwanda/
Uganda
June 19, 2010   
Attempted Assassination of Kayumba Nyamwasa
General Kayumba Nyamwasa, a former senior military official in Rwanda, narrowly escaped an assassination attempt in Johannesburg on June 19, 2010. He was seriously injured, but survived. The trial of six people (three of whom are Rwandan) accused of involvement in the assassination attempt is ongoing in South Africa at the time of writing.
Nyamwasa was a key figure in the RPF from its days as a rebel movement in Uganda, before the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. A close ally of Paul Kagame since the early 1990s, he held senior positions in the army, in the intelligence services, and in the gendarmerie. As chief of staff of the army in the late 1990s, he played a leading role in the counter-insurgency operations against elements of the former Rwandan army and militia—some of whom had participated in the 1994 genocide— who were mounting incursions into Rwanda from neighboring Congo.
In the following years, relations between Nyamwasa and Kagame deteriorated. Nyamwasa was marginalized and appointed ambassador to India in 2004. In February 2010, following a brief return to Rwanda, he fled to South Africa where he sought asylum and became an outspoken critic of Kagame. Together with several other former senior RPF officials (including Patrick Karegeya—see January 2014 entry below), Nyamwasa formed an opposition group in exile, the Rwanda National Congress (RNC).
In January 2011, Nyamwasa, Karegeya, and two other founding members of the RNC (Théogène Rudasingwa, former secretary general of the RPF and chief of staff of Kagame, and Gerald Gahima, former prosecutor general, both exiled in the USA) were tried in absentia by a military court in Kigali. They were found guilty of endangering state security, destabilizing public order, divisionism, defamation, and forming a criminal enterprise. Nyamwasa and Rudasingwa were each sentenced to 24 years' imprisonment and Karegeya and Gahima to 20 years.
Photo: © 2012 Reuters
South Africa
May
2011
Threats to René Mugenzi and Jonathan Musonera
In May 2011, two Rwandans living in the UK—René Mugenzi and Jonathan Musonera—were warned by the London Metropolitan Police about threats to their life from the Rwandan government. Mugenzi and Musonera are associated with the opposition in exile, but are not high-profile or prominent opponents. Mugenzi is a former RPF soldier and member of the RNC. Mugenzi has spoken publicly about human rights abuses in Rwanda, including to the British media and on Twitter.
A third Rwandan living in the UK, Noble Marara, associated with the opposition in exile, reported receiving threats too.
Previously, a number of Rwandan refugees reported being intimidated and harassed by Rwandan diplomatic representatives in the UK, in particular when they tried to organise public meetings on Rwanda. 
Photo: © private
United Kingdom
November 30, 2011
Murder of Charles Ingabire
Exiled Rwandan journalist Charles Ingabire was shot dead in the Ugandan capital Kampala on November 30, 2011. A survivor of the genocide in Rwanda, he had fled to Uganda in 2007. From exile he had written articles for Umuvugizi, a popular Rwandan newspaper which was suspended by the Media High Council in Rwanda in 2010 but has continued publishing online. At the time of his death, Ingabire was the editor of the online publication Inyenyeri News. Some of his articles were very critical of the government. He had joined the RNC, but was not a prominent member. He survived a first attack about two months before his murder and had reported to friends that he had been threatened several times.[10]
In the aftermath of Ingabire's murder, the Ugandan police said they were investigating the case and held two people for questioning. However, to date, no one has been charged with Ingabire's murder.
Photo: © private
Uganda
August 22, 2012
Attack on Frank Ntwali
Frank Ntwali is the brother-in-law of Kayumba Nyamwasa and chairperson of the RNC in South Africa, where he has been living for several years. On August 22, 2012, he was attacked in his car outside Johannesburg and stabbed repeatedly with a knife. He was injured but survived. 
Ntwali was due to testify at a South African court in the trial of the people accused of trying to assassinate Kayumba Nyamwasa.
South Africa
October 25, 2013
Forcible Return of Joel Mutabazi and Related Cases
On October 25, 2013, former Rwandan presidential bodyguard Joel Mutabazi, a refugee in Uganda, went missing from a location in Kampala where he was living under 24-hour Ugandan police protection. His whereabouts were unknown for six days. On October 31, the Rwandan police confirmed he was detained in Rwanda but refused to disclose where. On November 13, he appeared before a military court in Kigali, with 14 co-accused, charged with terrorism and other offenses. An additional three co-accused appeared in court in a second hearing. His co-accused include at least two other Rwandans who disappeared in Uganda: Mutabazi's younger brother Jackson Karemera, who had gone missing in Kampala around October 25, and another former presidential bodyguard, Innocent Kalisa, who had gone missing in Kampala in August.
Ugandan government and police officials blamed the Deputy Director of Uganda's Criminal Intelligence and Investigations Directorate, Joel Aguma, for "mistakenly" handing Mutabazi over to Rwanda without following proper extradition procedures. According to the Ugandan police, Aguma was suspended, pending
investigations. Human Rights Watch is not aware of further actions by the Ugandan authorities on this case.
Before his forced return to Rwanda, Mutabazi had already escaped an assassination attempt, as well as a bungled abduction, both in Uganda. In July 2012, an armed man came to the house where he was living at the time and shot at him, but missed. On August 20, 2013, armed men abducted him from a safe-house in a suburb of Kampala, where he had been moved for his protection following the assassination attempt. He was released the same day, thanks to an intervention by the Ugandan police. 
Mutabazi had been arrested in Rwanda in 2010 and held in Camp Kami, a military camp, for several months, where he was detained incommunicado and tortured. The Rwandan authorities suspected him of being close to Kayumba Nyamwasa.[11]   
Photo: © 2012 Jerome Starkey
Uganda
January 1, 2014
Murder of Patrick Karegeya
Patrick Karegeya, former head of Rwanda's external intelligence services from 1994 to 2004, was found dead in a hotel room in Johannesburg on January 1, 2014. The South African police have launched an investigation.
Karegeya had been imprisoned twice in Rwanda, in 2005 and 2006,[12] and had then fled to South Africa where he had been living since 2007. After Kayumba Nyamwasa joined him in South Africa in 2010, the two men co-founded the RNC. Since then, Karegeya had been publicly outspoken in his criticisms of the Rwandan government and President Kagame. 
Photo: © 2012 AP
South Africa

[1]This document does not cover the many cases of human rights abuses against Rwandans inside Rwanda since the RPF took power. Human Rights Watch has published numerous reports and press releases on these cases. Seehttps://www.hrw.org/africa/rwanda. One of the darkest moments in recent years was the period preceding the 2010 presidential elections, when an independent journalist and the vice-president of an opposition party were murdered, and several other opponents and critics arrested and threatened. For a chronology of these events, see Human Rights Watch, "Rwanda: attacks on freedom of expression, freedom of association and freedom of assembly in the run-up to presidential elections, January to July 2010" (August, 2010),https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/08/02/rwanda-attacks-freedom-expression-freedom-association-and-freedom-assembly-run-presi.
[2]Agence France Presse, reproduced by Capital FM (Kenya), "Kagame denies any link to Kampala journalist murder", December 12, 2011,http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2011/12/kagame-denies-any-link-to-kampala-journalist-murder/.
[3]This is presumed to be a reference to reports that Karegeya was strangled. 
[4]News of Rwanda, "Gen Kabarebe on Karegeya: 'When you choose to be a dog, you die like a dog", January 11, 2014,http://www.newsofrwanda.com/featured1/21824/gen-kabarebe-on-karegeya-when-you-choose-to-be-dog-you-die-like-dog/
[5]Translation from Kinyarwanda. For Kagame's full speech at the National Leaders' Prayer breakfast, January 12, 2014, seehttp://paulkagame.tv/podcast/?p=episode&name=2014-01-12_kagame_.mp3. Extracts of his speech were also broadcast on several Rwandan radio stations. While Kagame did not refer to Karegeya by name, there is little doubt that his comments were a reference to him and to his murder.
[6]For details, see "Human Rights Watch and the FIDH Condemn Assassination of Seth Sendashonga," Human Rights Watch and FIDH joint news release, May 19, 1998,http://www.hrw.org/en/news/1998/05/18/human-rights-watch-and-fidh-condemn-assassination-seth-sendashonga.
[8]For details, see Human Rights Watch, Preparing for Elections: Tightening Control in the Name of Unity, May 2003, pps. 8-9, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/05/08/preparing-elections. It is believed Hitimana was probably killed in Rwanda, but his case is included here because of a possible link with Uganda.
[9]For details, see Human Rights Watch, Preparing for Elections: Tightening Control in the Name of Unity, May 2003, p. 9, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/05/08/preparing-elections. As in the case of Hitimana, it is believed that Cyiza was probably killed in Rwanda.
[10]For details, see "Uganda/Rwanda: Investigate Journalist's Murder," Human Rights Watch news release, December 6, 2011,https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/12/06/ugandarwanda-investigate-journalist-s-murder.  
[11]For details on Mutabazi's forcible return from Uganda to Rwanda, see "Uganda/Rwanda: Forcible Return Raises Grave Concerns," Human Rights Watch news release, November 4, 2013, http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/11/04/ugandarwanda-forcible-return-raises-grave-concerns.
[12]For details of Karegeya's arrest and prosecution in Rwanda, see Human Rights Watch, Law and Reality: Progress in Judicial Reform in Rwanda, pps 65-66,https://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/07/25/law-and-reality.
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[RwandaLibre] A worrying map of the countries most likely to have a coup in 2014 - The Washington Post

 


A worrying map of the countries most likely to have a coup in 2014

 Published: JANUARY 28, 1:44 PM ET 

Click to enlarge. Data source: Jay Ulfelder coup forecasts for 2014. (Max Fisher/Washington Post)

Coups are bad news for any country. They weaken the rule of law, throw governments into chaos, undermine or outright jettison democratic norms and institutions, and can lead to violence, oppression or worse. They can also be tough to see coming, particularly since the people looking for them tend to focus on a single country, which can lead them to overemphasize local events and understate the broader dynamics that make coups happen, or not.

That's a big part of why political scientist Jay Ulfelder has, for the past three years, maintained a mathematical model to predict the likelihood of coups in almost every country around the world. By tracking over a dozen variables - from political system to years of independence the presence of absence of an "elite" ethnic group - Ulfelder's model roughly estimates the likelihood that each country will experience a coup this year. He "trained" the model by applying it over the years 1960 to 2010, further developing its ability to predict future coups by looking at past ones.

Ulfelder kindly shared his full dataset with me, which I've mapped out above. The redder countries are at higher risk for a coup and the yellower countries at lower risk. You can read his post herefor much, much more about how he designed this model and what makes it work.

Here are a few notes to help you read this map. First, even the most extreme cases are well below a 50 percent likelihood of a coup, meaning that a coup probably won't occur. Those would be the West African countries of Guinea and Mali (26.5 percent and 22.7 percent likelihoods of coups) and Madagascar, at 23.9 percent likelihood. Those numbers are high enough, though, to be appropriately alarming. Second, the numbers drop off quickly, with the vast majority of countries less than 5 percent likelihood of a coup, and half of them less than 1.5 percent. So the difference between a dark red country and a light orange or yellow country is very significant.

There are a few immediately obvious trends in the data. First, it doesn't look good for sub-Saharan Africa, which has the top nine most at-risk countries. Not all of Africa, to be clear, much of which is quite stable, but the risk is heavily concentrated in Africa's Sahel region (that east-west strip just below the Saharan desert) and in West and Central Africa. There are complex political, ethnic and post-colonial reasons for this,which I wrote about here. Looking forward, political instability and competition risks holding back a part of the world that is otherwise poised for long-overdue economic growth.

Here is a chart Ulfelder put together showing the 40 most at-risk countries. For each country, he's run two different models and then averaged the results. That bold dot is the average score:

The 40 countries most at risk for a coup in 2014 (Jay Ulfelder)

The stand-outs beyond sub-Saharan Africa also tell some interesting stories. The highest-ranked non-African country is Thailand, with a projected 10.9 percent likelihood of a coup this year. By some measurements, Thailand has more coups than any other countries on earth (here's why) and is currently experiencing another round of protests and political turmoil. Afghanistan and Pakistan are at high risk, though for different reasons (deep ethnic and political competition in Afghanistan, an independent-leaning military in Pakistan, weak civilian governments in both). Egypt, which saw a coup in 2013, has a projected 9 percent chance of another this year. Further afield are Haiti and Ecuador, the only two countries in the Western hemisphere with significant risks for coups, with 9.2 and 8.5 percent projected, respectively. (This is why I wrote, in June, that NSA leaker Edward Snowden would be wise to turn down Ecuador's offer of asylum; the next government could change its mind.)

It's also worth pausing to appreciate the luxury many countries have of not worrying about coups. A lot of democratic as well as authoritarian states, rich as well as poor, have strong enough rule of law and institutional norms that they don't have to worry about coups. Ulfelder's model predicts only a 0.15 percent chance in the United States; many Western democracies show similar scores. So do some countries experiencing political turmoil, such as Greece and Cuba (0.14 and 0.21 percent risk, respectively). Iran, for all its problems and political infighting, only rates a 1.43 percent chance of a coup. That's probably great news for the United States: even if we don't like the Iranian government, it's preferable to chaos, and a government that can negotiate without worrying about a military coup has a freer hand to accept any U.S. nuclear deal.

For more on coups, what makes them likely or not, and the implications of this data, bookmark Ulfelder's blog, which will be revisiting these topics throughout the year.

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[RwandaLibre] Full end-of-mission statement by the Special Rapporteur @Rwanda

 

Statement by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to
freedom of peaceful assembly and of association at the conclusion of
his visit to the Republic of Rwanda

Kigali, 27 January 2014

I would like to thank the Government of the Republic of Rwanda for
inviting me to carry out a visit to the country. I commend Rwanda for
being the first country in Africa to extend an invitation to my
mandate since its establishment by the Human Rights Council in October
2010. I thank the Government for its excellent cooperation before and
during the conduct of this mission. I am most grateful to all
interlocutors I have met. I had fruitful exchanges with the Prime
Minister, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Internal Security,
the Minister of Local Government, the Minister of Public Service and
Labour, the Minister of Trade and Industry, the Minister of East
African Community, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and the Inspector General of Rwanda National Police.
Moreover, I had the opportunity to meet with the Governor of the South
Province and the Mayor of Huye.

I also met the Chief Justice, the President of the High Court, the
Prosecutor General, the Deputy Speaker of the Parliament, and the
Chair of the Committee on Unity, Human Rights and fight against
Genocide of the Chamber of Deputies and its members. I had meetings
with the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, the Director of
the Directorate General of Immigration and Emigration, the Chief
Executive Officer of the Rwanda Governance Board, representatives of
the Rwanda Human Rights Commission, and national and international
non-governmental organizations, leaders of political parties, the
Private Sector Federation, and representatives of diplomatic missions.

As Rwanda, and indeed the world, prepare to honour the memory of the
victims of the Genocide 20 years since 1994, I would like to extend my
best wishes and strength to the people of Rwanda, all of whom have
been touched by this most egregious of human rights violations. Bon
courage. I was humbled when I visited Rwanda during the 10th and 15th
commemorations of the Genocide against the Tutsis and moderate Hutus.

As a Special Rapporteur, I am independent from the United Nations and
I work voluntarily in my personal capacity. The overarching purpose of
my visit to Rwanda is to contribute to the efforts it has undertaken
in its path towards democratization, greater protection of human
rights, and development with recommendations as to how Rwanda can
better respect, promote and implement international human rights law
and standards as it applies to the freedoms of peaceful assembly and
association.

Rwanda has come a long way since 1994. There has been remarkable
progress in developing infrastructure, building institutions and
ensuring stability and security. Twenty years is a short time in the
life of a nation, which makes the achievements all the more
outstanding. Indeed few could have predicted that the reconstruction
of the Rwandan State could have reached such broad and deep levels in
1994. I am truly impressed by the resilience of the Rwandan people,
the vibrancy of the economic sector, the relatively low levels of
corruption, efforts at providing universal healthcare and social
safety nets, and the neat and clean environment. This must be
recognized, and applauded.

In the spirit of constructive dialogue, I wish to make some
preliminary observations and recommendations. The Government has
assured me that it sees this as an opportunity to consolidate the
progress made over the years towards the realization of the rights to
freedom of peaceful assembly and of association in the country.

Rwanda has ratified key international human rights instruments and
committed itself to observe them. Moreover, in 2011 during the
Universal Periodic Review Rwanda accepted all recommendations
pertaining to the freedoms I am mandated to monitor. My assessment is
guided by these principles.

Freedom of peaceful assembly

The Constitution guarantees freedom of peaceful assembly. Law No.
33.91 provides for prior notification for demonstrations on public
roads and public assemblies. But it also then requires prior
authorization for assemblies in open air, on public roads or in a
public space in the interests of public safety, tranquillity or
health. This creates an inherent contradiction in requiring both prior
notification and authorization, paving the way for arbitrary decisions
by the concerned authorities.

I firmly believe that the exercise of the right to freedom of peaceful
assembly should not be subject to authorization by the authorities. At
most, a prior notification procedure is sufficient, in order to
facilitate peaceful assemblies and to take measures to protect public
safety and order and the rights and freedoms of others. Moreover,
spontaneous assemblies should be recognized in law and exempted from
prior notification.

I was informed that in practice only peaceful assemblies which
authorities favour are allowed to take place, such as the
commemorations marches organized by Ibuka, which are also facilitated
by the authorities. Peaceful protests voicing dissent and criticizing
Government policies are reportedly not allowed.

For instance, students who presented a petition to the Prime Minister
protesting against the reduction of scholarships were arrested for
illegal demonstration. Similarly, members of a religious group who
staged a peaceful protest to submit a petition to the President were
arrested on the same ground. In addition, Mr Sylvain Sibomana,
Secretary General of the Unified Democratic Forces FDU-Inkingi, was
arrested with a fellow party member outside a courtroom while
attending the trial of Ms Victoire Ingabire, Chair of the same party.
They both wore T-shirts with the inscription "democracy and justice".
Mr Sibomana was injured by law enforcement officials in the course of
his arrest.

According to the authorities, peaceful protests do not occur because
there are other avenues to express criticism and solve contentious
issues. That is well and good. However, not only are such avenues
limited, but as illustrated by the aforementioned cases, the fear of
being targeted has contributed to individuals and associations
refraining from exercising their right to peaceful assembly to voice
their grievances.

From my meeting with the Inspector General of the Police, it came out
clearly that law enforcement officials view peaceful assemblies solely
as an issue of ensuring public order, instead of adopting a human
rights based approach that would facilitate assemblies as an integral
right of every person in Rwanda to be protected robustly.

Let me emphasize that peaceful assemblies should not be feared. Rather
they should be encouraged for there is value in expressing
disagreement and differences peacefully and publicly. Indeed, there is
no better gauge of what citizens think than peaceful protests. And it
is in the interests of the state to allow public and peaceful
assemblies as a "release valve" in order to avoid recourse to other
means of dissent and disagreement that are not desirable. As stated by
the Human Rights Council, "everyone must be able to express their
grievances or aspirations in a peaceful manner, including through
public protests without fear of reprisals or of being intimidated,
harassed, injured... arbitrarily arrested [and] detained..." (resolution
22/10).

The undue restrictions on freedom of peaceful assembly have also
impacted negatively on the enjoyment of freedom of association as
several associations have been prevented from holding general
assemblies, a key requirement for forming a political party or a
non-governmental organization. Indeed, several political activists,
holding dissenting views, have been arrested for holding meetings to
recruit members even in bars.

Freedom of association
Non-governmental organizations

The Constitution guarantees freedom of association. This right is
further elaborated in the recently enacted laws governing the
organisation and functioning of local and international
non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Although the legislation is an
improvement from previous laws it nevertheless has maintained onerous
and burdensome conditions for registration.

Local NGOs are required to hold a general assembly in order to appoint
their legal representatives and office-bearers. Among other
requirements, the minutes of these meetings including the signatures
of all those who attended the general assembly should then be
submitted to the regulatory authority, the Rwanda Governance Board
(RGB). In my discussions with representatives from various
organizations, it was apparent that while some organizations were not
required to notify local authorities prior to holding their general
assemblies, others - particularly the ones more critical of government
- reported that they had to get prior authorization for these
meetings. I urge the Government to ensure that prior notification or
authorisation is not required for associations to hold private
meetings.

To organise a general assembly means expending considerable financial
and human resources, which many organizations can scarcely afford.
Both local and international NGOs are required to provide letters of
collaboration with authorities in the districts in which they operate.
Again the financial cost, time and energy it takes to obtain these
letters, from all districts in which the organizations wishes to
operate, constitutes a serious drain on the resources of
organizations. The Directorate of Immigration, which is responsible
for the registration of international NGOs, requires that in addition,
they provide evidence of funding for the period which they seek
registration, up to 5 years. Most funding sources are unable to
guarantee funding for multiple years. Many international NGOs are
therefore forced to seek annual registration as they can only provide
proof of financial resources for a year at a time. The enormous time
and energy necessary to put together the registration requirements
could be devoted to activities benefitting the community.

The contrast between the registration process for NGOs--a non-state
actor--and that of businesses--also a non-state actor--in the private
sector is striking. The business environment in Rwanda is notable for
the ease with which businesses can be registered and operate. It is
one reason for Rwanda's economic transformation. A similar approach to
the civil society sector will yield significant economic, social and
political dividends, allowing for innovation and creativity.

As I have stated in my first thematic report to the Human Rights
Council on best practices, registration procedures should be simple,
non-onerous and expeditious. I consider that the right to freedom of
association protects associations that are not registered and, in
fact, registration should be by choice of association members and not
a pre-requisite for the operation of associations.

Many of the interlocutors I met highlighted the role of the RGB in the
life of local NGOs and faith-based organizations. Apart from
registering local NGOs, RGB also has the responsibility of monitoring
whether local NGOs and FBOs conform with domestic law. This broad
language provides unjustifiable room for RGB to interfere with the
internal affairs of local NGOs.

The case of the Rwandan League for the Promotion and Defense of Human
Rights (LIPRODHOR) was brought to my attention in this regard. Of
particular concern is the partisan role that RGB reportedly played in
changing the leadership of LIPRODHOR under questionable circumstances.
Similarly, RGB was implicated in determining the leadership at the
Rwandan Collective of Leagues and Associations for the Defense of
Human Rights (CLADHO).

The independence and ability of associations to run their internal
affairs without external interference is of paramount importance in
the exercise of the right to freedom of association. I see no
justification for RGB involving itself in leadership wrangles within
local NGOs. Resolution of such conflict should be the responsibility
of the membership of the organization and ultimately the courts, with
RGB's role purely to endorse the leadership determined by the NGOs
themselves or the courts. As a general principle, Government's role in
the civil society sector should mirror the role it plays in the
private sector--solely that of registering entities within the sector.

It is abundantly evident to me that the Government of Rwanda has a
clear vision of where it wants the country to be by 2020. This vision
of development is inclusive and creates various spaces for interaction
amongst the different stakeholders. At the local level, interactions
take place in the context of Joint Action Development Forums (JADF)
and plans, and I understand that these collaborations have been
fruitful.

Nevertheless, I am concerned that the development partnerships between
the Government and local and international NGOs are of a compulsory
nature. This is evidenced by the necessity of collaboration letters,
action plans that must align with the development objectives of the
district, down to the level of activities, and in some cases demands
for performance contracts to be concluded between local authorities
and all NGOs. In fact, the perception of some in Government and in the
civil society sector appears to be that NGOs are implementers of
Government policy.

In order to protect the autonomy and independence of NGOs, I recommend
that any partnerships between Government and civil society be
voluntary rather than compulsory. In the development field, NGOs
should be able to determine and operate within their priority areas of
concern without interference or direction by authorities. This does
not preclude areas that authorities do not consider to be a priority.
The power of innovation is enhanced through openness. A multiplicity
of interventions and approaches will serve to strengthen the capacity
of the sector to respond to the needs of their beneficiaries and
ultimately, to Rwandans as a whole.

I am also concerned by the stigmatization of local and international
NGOs that has persisted in State-controlled media, and from Government
officials, especially following the decisions of some donor agencies
to channel funding for development through NGOs. While there should be
transparency between donors and the State with regard to the sectors
they are supporting and how much, the same approach the State takes to
the private sector--which is regarded as a key actor in
development--should obtain. Moreover, labelling of civil society actors
who are critical of the Government as enemies of the State compromises
their safety.

Let me also urge the Government to urgently complete its
investigations, in a transparent way, into the death of Mr Gustave
Sharangabo Makonene from Transparency International-Rwanda murdered in
July 2013. As long as the circumstances of his death remain unclear,
this case has a chilling effect on the NGO community in Rwanda.

Political parties

Concerning political parties, I have observed a lack of space for
individuals to express dissenting views. The Government of Rwanda
favours "consensus politics" and discourages public criticism and
dissent. I am concerned that there is no genuine pluralistic society.

Indeed it appears that every dissenting political leader who rejects
this consensus approach gets into legal trouble, with negations of the
genocide, divisionism, sectarianism, and even spreading rumors being
the favoured charges. In other cases, corruption charges for those who
leave the RPF are preferred. And in all such cases, these politicians
are accused of violence or having links with violent groups. This
sends a chilling and unacceptable message that peaceful public
disagreement with the Government is equivalent to criminality. The
legitimate combat against terrorism, and other security
considerations, should not be used as a bogeyman to restrict the right
to freely associate.

This is the case of Ms Victoire Ingabire, Mr Sylvain Sibomana and Mr
Anselme Mutuyimana from the FDU Inkingi, an opposition party denied
registration to date, as well as of Mr Bernard Ntaganda from the PS
Imberakuri. They were all sentenced from 4 to 15 years on similar
charges. The sentences of 5 years and more will ban them from ever
holding leadership positions in any political organization, according
to the Law governing political organizations and politicians. And in
all these cases, I was informed that they were being pressured to
leave their parties and join the RPF or its allied parties.

History teaches us that not allowing peaceful dissent and branding a
criminal every politician who resists the consensus approach, increase
the attractiveness of alternative ways of dissent that are not helpful
to Rwanda, or its people. I was therefore heartened to hear the
Justice Minister's assurance which I hope can be implemented that: "if
you are dissenting peacefully, please go ahead."

Rwanda favours a political order based on consensus led by the ruling
party. The Government and Parliament seem to agree that Rwanda needs
to be more cautious with political parties than with NGOs, given its
recent history. But 20 years since the Genocide, the successful
reconstruction of the Rwandan State should provide confidence to the
Government that it can and should allow peaceful dissent and
disagreement. Whether political parties decide to align with the
Government is their choice, but this should not be compulsory in law
or in fact.

On registration of parties, in addition to the barriers opposition
political parties face when required to hold general assemblies to
define their status, the overall process is long, laborious and, in
far too many instances, arbitrary. Technical reasons can never justify
a 4-year delay to register, as it has been the case for the Green
party.

In addition, it is crucial that individuals exercising the right to
associate, including opposition party members, are able to operate
freely and without fear. State officials' public comments celebrating
the killing of an opposition politician inculcate fear within the
opposition.

Now turning to the National Human Rights Commission of Rwanda, I note
the work it has undertaken in promoting and protecting human rights in
the country. However, relevant stakeholders should take adequate
measures to enhance the independence and capacity of the Commission.

I call on the Office of the High Commissioner for Human rights and the
United Nations Development Programme to continue their efforts to
strengthen the capacity of civil society to engage on human rights
issues, without using State bodies as intermediaries. I also urge them
to continue their work capacitating State officials to meet their
obligations under international law. I further call on the
international community to especially continue providing political and
financial support to genuinely independent NGOs.

To conclude, once again, I wish to state that the above preliminary
conclusions and recommendations are shared as a friend of Rwanda. I
have offered, and the Government has accepted, my help to further
strengthen the exercise of the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly
and of association.

I thank you for your attention.

END

http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14201&LangID=E

--
SIBOMANA Jean Bosco
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[RwandaLibre] To Aid, or Not to Aid? The Case of Rwanda

 

To Aid, or Not to Aid? The Case of Rwanda

Economic Development, Governance
2013 - 04 - 29
Omar S. McDoom
UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe

What should donors do when confronted with regimes that violate
important normative standards of state behavior and commit human
rights abuses, war crimes or other grave ethical transgressions?

During the cold war, instrumental use of aid to support strategic
foreign policy objectives provoked little controversy if it supported
allies whose behaviour affronted morally. Today, however, ethical
concerns whose roots lie in primarily Western conceptions of justice
and liberty find stronger expression in public opinion and civil
society. Indeed, human rights are likely to be part of the post-2015
development agenda. Taxpayer-funded support for illegitimate and
repressive regimes faces much stronger scrutiny now, especially in
times of austerity at home.

Post-genocide Rwanda represents one particularly high-profile and
difficult dilemma for Western donors. Rwanda is not an unequivocal
case of an egregious wrongdoer. Its critics point to the country's
poor performance in international measures of human rights compliance
and political freedoms, and the regime stands accused by the UN of
promoting war in eastern Congo. Yet the same regime enjoys the moral
distinction of ending the genocide whilst the world stood by —
inaction that now weighs heavily on the bystanders' consciences and
that constrains their criticisms. The regime has also made remarkable
achievements in respect of growth, public good provision and,
according to government data, also poverty and inequality reduction,
notwithstanding the enormous damage to its society and economy wrought
by the violence.

The dilemma has keenly tested the judgment of Rwanda's second-largest
donor, the UK. In the course of last year, The Department for
International Development (DFID) suspended, reinstated, and then
suspended again budgetary support for Rwanda. Its equivocation tells
of the complex choice that donors face in whether to aid or not to aid
regimes whose ethical records raise concerns at the international
level.

"The DFID suspended, reinstated, and then suspended again budgetary
support for Rwanda. Its equivocation tells of the complex choice that
donors face...."

The arguments are persuasive on both sides of the debate. Freezing
aid, in full or in part, is a method for signalling disapproval of
government behaviours that violate international obligations and other
important normative standards. Enforced consistently, it can help
build and sustain an international legal and moral order. Moreover, to
ignore offending behaviour can have very serious consequences.

Rwanda, for example, was itself a highly-favoured aid recipient on the
eve of its 1994 genocide, despite a series of credibly documented
ethnic massacres prior to this. The stakes, however, need not be so
high to justify donor response. Continued support of a regime that is
unresponsive to and repressive of its citizens undermines the
coherence of a development programme whose explicit objective is to
improve the welfare and alleviate the suffering of the poor.

Yet the counterarguments are also strong. Should wealthy donors
enforce standards of acceptable behaviour for poorer aid recipients?
The question is particularly relevant if consistent enforcement is
subject to political considerations and if donors are vulnerable to
claims of dual standards. Freezing aid may also, depending on the
nature of the aid, ultimately end up punishing the poor for the
actions of their leaders.

Moreover, the ruling elite in highly aid-dependent countries may
engage in radical measures to assure their survival if the regime's
stability is threatened. The effectiveness of cutting aid is also
questionable. It may take time for the effects to be felt, especially
if donors do not co-ordinate among themselves ,or if the regime can
turn to another source of financing. China's strict policy of
non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states for example
makes it an attractive alternative to Western donors.

An assessment of Rwanda today yields a mixed record.

Positively, President Paul Kagame and his ruling Rwandan Patriotic
Front (RPF) have set out an ambitious vision for Rwanda to become a
middle-income country by 2020, and they have made remarkable progress
since 1994. Growth has averaged over 6 percent per annum, the service
sector has overtaken agriculture in its contribution to GDP, regional
trade has gone up, and most recently poverty and inequality have gone
down according to the latest government data. The social sectors have
recorded progress too. Child and maternal mortality have dropped
significantly and free, universal primary education has been
established. On the governance front, donors commend Rwanda for the
improved effectiveness of its civil service and its achievements in
reducing low- and mid-level corruption. Rwanda also boasts the highest
number of female parliamentarians in the world.

Less positively, however, there has been a decline in political
freedom with authoritarian constraints imposed on independent media
and opposition political parties and with irregularities in the 2003
and 2010 elections. Social cohesion remains poor 18 years after the
genocide despite a prohibition on ethnic identification and an attempt
to forge a national identity; ethnic grievances persist, subterranean,
in both the exclusion of

Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) crimes from the gacaca courts
established to deal with crimes committed during the genocide and in
the perceived pro-Tutsi allocation of state and para-statal jobs; and
the regime faces accusations of supporting rebel groups in eastern
Congo that have targeted civilians and destabilized the region.

Given Rwanda's record, what then should an influential donor such as
DFID do? There is no magic bullet for Rwanda, or indeed for other
countries whose records prompt this question. Instead I suggest five
guiding principles to help shape donors' thinking as they respond to
offending regimes:

Think longer term — beyond the current regime of the aid recipient and
beyond the current regime of their own country.

Adapt the immediate response and longer-term engagement strategy to
the distinguishing contextual characteristics of the country.

Agree — contractually and publicly — on the principles that will
govern the donor-recipient relationship

ex ante, with clear redlines and defined consequences for unacceptable
behaviours, and be consistent in their enforcement.

Where possible, consult and co-ordinate with other donors on both the
immediate response and the criteria for re- engagement.

Attempt to assess whether the overall direction of change within the
country has been towards improving or worsening the welfare of its
people.

What then is the outcome of applying these five principles to Rwanda?

First, while Rwanda's remarkable progress is attributable to the RPF
and its leadership under Paul Kagame, thinking long term means asking
whether this progress could be sustained without them. Donors then
should remember their relationship is with the country, and not with a
particular regime or individual.

"Donors should remember their relationship is with the country, and
not with a particular regime or individual."

While it is politically useful to be able to showcase aid successfully
at work today, it can easily be undone tomorrow. Twenty-one years of
donor support to President Habyarimana's regime were tragically
undermined with his assassination on 6 April 1994. Thinking long term
also means discounting personal friendships between political leaders
of donors and recipients (Tony Blair and Clare Short were both close
to Paul Kagame for example) and resisting the usually shorter-term
considerations of the donor's foreign policy establishment.

Second, contextually, Rwanda has a highly unusual ethnic demography
for sub-Saharan Africa. The country comprises only three ethnic
groups, and one group (the Hutu) numerically dominates the (Tutsi and
Twa) minorities. A competitive political system where power is
divided, as in a majoritarian system, rather than shared, as in a
consociational system, may be inappropriate, then, in the wake of
recent ethnic violence. To its credit, DFID does not promote democracy
in Rwanda. It aims instead to improve domestic accountability.

Third, DFID's Memorandum of Understanding, in which it set out its
partnership principles with the Government of Rwanda, is a very useful
model for how to structure a country relationship. It is a public
document setting out the agreement between the two countries on what
each party will do and what happens if the agreement is broken. The
agreement does, however, need to be consistently enforced.

Fourth, freezing aid would have been more effective if Rwanda's
largest donors had acted together. As it is, the UK cut budget
support, the US cut only military aid, and the World Bank is still
deciding what to do.

Fifth, while Rwanda's government appears to be relatively responsive
to the needs of its people, it invites speculation on its legitimacy
through its authoritarian controls on political freedom. It defends
these measures by claiming ethnically divisive elements persist in
Rwandan politics and society. The claim has some merit. Rwanda's
political opposition and media need to show they will use any greater
freedom given to them responsibly.

A donor's response then should consider the overall direction of
change. Is the government incrementally liberalizing politically? I
would suggest not. Are civil and political society incrementally
maturing? I would argue they have not been given the opportunity.
Taking all of this into account, in my view, DFID's decision to
suspend budgetary support then is warranted.

DFID, and other donors, however, have responded principally to
Rwanda's illegal and bellicose actions in eastern Congo. But should
they also respond to the declining political space within Rwanda?

I have argued elsewhere that the possibility of an
extra-constitutional regime change is increasing within Rwanda

.

It is not clear presently who could succeed the RPF or Paul Kagame.
The independent opposition remains heavily constrained, and dissenters
or rivals within the RPF have fled into exile. It is also unclear how
change would happen within the constitution. The RPF incumbents,
silently perceived as a Tutsi party, exercise strict control over the
electoral process. They fear free and fair elections would empower the
Hutu majority and lead to the persecution of Rwanda's Tutsi minority
once more.

At present, the greatest risk of regime change is a coup from within
the ruling party. The power vacuum and ensuing power struggle this
would create would likely be accompanied by violence (though mass
violence is unlikely). Seen through this lens, the remarkable
achievements since the genocide for which donors commend Rwanda's
present government seem very fragile.

President Kagame and the RPF have accomplished much for Rwanda, but
they cannot be expected to rule forever. Indeed, Rwanda's constitution
mandates President Kagame to step down in August 2017 at the end of
his second term.

Given the risk of extra-constitutional regime change, it is in the
government's strategic self-interest to gradually transition the
country to a point where power can be transferred lawfully and
peacefully, and where civil and political society can act as a
responsible counterweight to a legitimate and responsive government.
Donors should keep this endpoint in mind as they ponder whether to
continue or to suspend aid.

♦ ♦ ♦

This article previously appeared in the January WIDER Angle
newsletter.under the title "To Aid or Not to Aid? The Case of Rwanda,
DFID, and the Good Aid Debate

http://www.google.ca/gwt/x?gl=CA&hl=en-CA&u=http://unu.edu/publications/articles/to-aid-or-not-to-aid-the-case-of-rwanda.html&q=should+repressive+rwanda+regime+receive+foreign+aid%3F&sa=X&ei=z0zoUr78AqSd0QWbqYH4Ag&ved=0CDEQFjAC

--
SIBOMANA Jean Bosco
Google+: https://plus.google.com/110493390983174363421/posts
YouTube Channel: http://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL9B4024D0AE764F3D
http://www.youtube.com/user/sibomanaxyz999
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[RwandaLibre] Re: Is Rwanda's Kagame Connected to the Sudden Death of Komla Afeke Dumor? Was it Murder? - Salem-News.Com

 

Peut-on savoir plus précisément la cause du décès de Komla Dumor:
Empoisonnement? Assassinat? Mort naturelle?

Quant au lien avec l'entrevue avec l'ambassadeur du Rwanda @UK, à quel
endroit l'entrevue a eu lieu: aux bureaux de BBC ou chez
l'ambassadeur? Qui avait sollicité cette entrevue: la BBC, la victime
ou l'ambassadeur?

Je pose trop de questions, certainement que vous n'avez pas de
réponses à toutes, mais ces questions hantent déjà les enquêteurs
anglais sur le dossier.

J'ai déjà posté sur ces forums la vidéo de Komla Dumor avec Bill
Clinton. Il avait l'air d'un journaliste à l'aise avec les grands de
ce monde. Mais comme disent les mafiosi (Mafia): à force de voler trop
près du soleil, on finit par se brûler les ailes!

Sibomana Jean Bosco.

[RwandaLibre] Is Rwanda's Kagame Connected to the Sudden Death of
Komla Afeke Dumor? Was it Murder? - Salem-News.Com Libellés : Forums

Nzinink - 17:43

à nzinink

http://salem-news.com/articles/january282014/dumor-kagame-tk-sg.php

Jan-28-2014 11:27
Is Rwanda's Kagame Connected to the Sudden Death of Komla Afeke Dumor?
Was it Murder?

Tim King and Sabine Grund for Salem-News.com
"Is Rwanda's Pres. Paul Kagame a visionary or a dictator?" - Facebook
post by Komla Dumor

(SALEM/BERLIN) - The BBCreported that Williams Nkurunziza, Rwanda's
high commissioner to the UK, said former Rwandan intelligence chief
Patrick Karegeya was an "enemy of the state". Mr Karegeya was
apparently murdered, his body was discovered in a South African hotel
room. Police in South African police said the 53-year-old may have
been strangled. A rope and bloodied towel were found in the safe of
the hotel room where his body was discovered. (see: BBC - Rwanda
ambassador: Karegeya 'was enemy of the state')

Dumor interviews Kagame - BBC

Komla Afeke Dumor passed away suddenly on 18th January 2014 in London.
He is the former host of Network Africa for BBC World Service, who
joined The World Today programme. Mr. Dumor became the first host of
the African business news programme on BBC World News, Africa Business
Report.

On 20 May 2013, Komla Dumor asked Rwandan President Paul Kagame about
allegations that his country was using proxy forces in the Democratic
Republic of Congo. This is a widely reported story; that Kagame was
using rebel forces to pillage resources from Congo, for landlocked
Rwanda. Kagame told Dumor that the allegations are "ridiculous" and
"an effort to circumvent the real problem". (see: BBC - Paul Kagame
denies Rwanda proxies in DR Congo)

The BBC reported, "UN experts have cited evidence that Rwanda and
Uganda are backing the M23 rebel group, which has been active in
eastern DR Congo since last year."

Dumar conducted an interview with former U.S. President Bill Clinton
in recent months, about his support for Kagame when so many
allegations of Kagame's criminality have been raised. Dumar also
criticized Rwanda's lack of free press in his interview with Clinton,
which Clinton defended.

It is clear that Dumar was trying to raise awareness of the very
serious problems tied to Kagame.

The possible murder of BBC journalist Komla Dumor, seems even more
possible considering that he had a very interesting interview with the
Rwandan ambassador four days before he suddenly died, inexplicably, at
the age of 41. His sudden death was reported to be a suicide. Amadou
Camara with allafrica.com wrote,

"What makes the story unbelievable was that I saw Komla Dumor that
week presenting his Africa flagship programme, Focus on Africa, on
television. He was visibly healthy alive and kicking buoyed with
energy and enthusiasm, as always. I can vividly recall his last
programme. The headline on that day was on a veiled threat that the
charismatic but ruthless Rwandan President, Paul Kagame, gave to
political dissidents of his country. After flashing his infectious
smile to the camera, Komla Dumor read the headlines and settled to
interview the Rwandan High Commission to the United Kingdom, Williams
Nkurunziza. He fired his question addressing him as Mr., always
showing respect to people, he asked by saying that betraying your
country have its consequences whether President Kagame was tacitly
acknowledging that his assassins gun down the former Rwandan spy
chief, Patrick Karageya, who was strangled to death in his hotel room
in South Africa. Unsurprisingly, the question sent chills of unease in
the High Commissioner, who mumbled a denial before deliberately
plunging into the strong economic credentials of President Kagame's
government, an often-repeated tactics by regime figures whenever the
ruthless side of the president against political opponents is
mentioned."

Amadou Camara also referenced that from 22-25 January, all roads would
be leading to Davos, Switzerland. "All the political and economic
heavyweight of Africa would make the case for investors to look at the
potentials that lie in investing in Africa." Mr. Dumos's death was
announced on 18 January

--
SIBOMANA Jean Bosco
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“Uwigize agatebo ayora ivi”. Ubutegetsi bukugira agatebo ukariyora uko bukeye n’uko bwije.

"Ce dont j’ai le plus peur, c’est des gens qui croient que, du jour au lendemain, on peut prendre une société, lui tordre le cou et en faire une autre."

“The price good men pay for indifference to public affairs is to be ruled by evil men.”

“The hate of men will pass, and dictators die, and the power they took from the people will return to the people. And so long as men die, liberty will never perish.”

“I have loved justice and hated iniquity: therefore I die in exile."

KOMEZA USOME AMAKURU N'IBITEKEREZO BYA VUBA BYAGUCITSE:

RECOMMENCE

RECOMMENCE

1.Kumenya Amakuru n’amateka atabogamye ndetse n’Ibishobora Kukugiraho Ingaruka ni Uburenganzira Bwawe.

2.Kwisanzura mu Gutanga Ibitekerezo, Kurwanya Ubusumbane, Akarengane n’Ibindi Byose Bikubangamiye ni Uburenganzira Bwawe.